Liverpool entered the summer transfer window 2026 with a huge rebuild in front of them after a fifth-place Premier League finish and the arrival of Andoni Iraola. The club backed its new manager with roughly £250m in permanent transfer spending, yet the squad still has three obvious problems. The attack lacks a natural successor to Mohamed Salah on the right, the defence lost major experience, and the midfield lacks a specialist holding player. Liverpool spent heavily, but the distribution of that money raises awkward questions.
Was spending £123m on Bradley Barcola the wrong priority?
Bradley Barcola possesses the qualities that make defenders uncomfortable. He attacks space quickly, carries the ball at pace and can beat his marker from a standing start. Nobody should judge the transfer purely on talent. The bigger concern concerns squad construction.
Liverpool paid Paris Saint-Germain a reported £123m package for Barcola, with the guaranteed fee around £106m. The French forward generally prefers the left side, where Liverpool already have Cody Gakpo and Rio Ngumoha, while Victor Muñoz gives Iraola another option across the wide forward positions.
That creates a strange imbalance. Salah left for Trabzonspor after his Liverpool contract expired, removing one of the club’s most productive right-sided attackers. Liverpool therefore needed a player who could carry responsibility from that flank, yet the biggest attacking purchase instead added another elite option on the left.
Iraola can move Barcola across. He can switch Gakpo. He can change the shape. Still, every adjustment creates another question because players usually produce their best football in familiar positions.
The price makes the decision harder to defend. Liverpool committed a huge portion of their summer budget to an attacker who didn’t solve the most obvious vacancy, while other areas needed immediate reinforcement.
Why did Liverpool allow three senior players to leave for nothing?
This decision carries a different kind of sting because Liverpool surrendered Salah, Ibrahima Konaté and Andy Robertson without collecting transfer fees.
Salah represented the biggest loss. His goals, creativity and experience shaped Liverpool’s attack for years, while Robertson supplied energy, crossing and aggressive movement from left-back. Konaté, meanwhile, gave the defence pace and physical presence.
Liverpool made the strategic choice to let all three contracts expire at the same time. That choice meant the club lost three established starters and received no significant transfer income from their departures.
Robertson moved to Tottenham, Konaté joined Real Madrid and Salah signed for Trabzonspor. Liverpool then had to spend heavily simply to restore basic squad numbers and experience.
Jeremy Jacquet arrived from Rennes for a fee reported at £60m, but asking a young defender to replace the authority of an established senior centre-back creates a different challenge. Ronald Araújo arrived on loan from Barcelona, yet a temporary deal cannot fully solve the loss of long-term defensive continuity.
Liverpool could have renewed one or more contracts earlier, sold a player before the final year or staggered departures across different summers. Instead, three influential figures exited together. That decision left Iraola rebuilding several parts of the side at once.
Did the loss of experience create a bigger problem than the fees suggest?
Transfer fees often dominate discussion, but dressing-room experience is genuinely valuable. Liverpool’s recent title and European campaigns relied on players who knew how to handle pressure, protect leads and respond after poor performances.
Now the group contains more responsibility for younger players and recent arrivals. That doesn’t guarantee failure, but the margin for mistakes becomes smaller.
A new manager already has to introduce his tactical ideas, establish his pressing patterns and decide which combinations work best. Losing three senior figures at the same time adds another layer of disruption.
Liverpool’s early results illustrate the issue. They opened the league season strongly, but then endured three draws in four matches, including a goalless draw against Fulham at Anfield. The team has shown flashes of quality, yet the attack has lacked consistency and the midfield has struggled to control matches for long periods.
Experience won’t solve every tactical problem. Still, removing so much of it in one summer placed a heavy burden on the recruitment team.
Was selling Curtis Jones another mistake?
Curtis Jones leaving Liverpool for Inter Milan for a deal worth up to £30m looks increasingly significant because of what happened elsewhere in midfield.
Jones never operated as a classic defensive midfielder, but he gave Liverpool an extra body who could press, carry possession, link areas and cover different roles. He understood the club’s demands, knew the Premier League and had years of experience inside Liverpool’s first-team environment.
Iraola reportedly wanted Jones to remain, yet the club accepted Inter’s offer. Stefan Bajcetic then departed for Celta Vigo, reducing the midfield options again.
Liverpool gained useful funds from Jones, and £30m represents a respectable return for a player who had struggled for an undisputed starting role. The timing, however, raises doubts. The squad needed greater midfield depth, not less, and Liverpool didn’t replace Jones with another player possessing his combination of athleticism, passing and familiarity with the league.
That decision matters even more because the club then ignored another glaring midfield requirement.
Why did Liverpool fail to sign a specialist number six?
This arguably represents Liverpool’s clearest tactical omission.
Alexis Mac Allister can play deeper and distribute the ball neatly. Ryan Gravenberch can carry possession through midfield. Dominik Szoboszlai can press, run beyond the ball and contribute around the penalty area. Yet Liverpool don’t have an obvious specialist whose first job involves screening the centre-backs and breaking up opposition attacks.
A proper number six reads danger before it becomes a counter-attack, covers space when full-backs advance and gives more attacking midfielders freedom to move higher. Without that player, Mac Allister or another midfielder may have to spend too much time protecting the back four.
The problem becomes sharper after losing Jones and Bajcetic. Liverpool removed depth, then left the specialist position untouched.
Iraola can solve some of this through structure. He can ask Gravenberch to hold, use a deeper double pivot or adjust the full-back positions. Every solution, however, changes another part of the team.
Could Liverpool have spent the same money more effectively?
That’s the central criticism of the Liverpool summer transfer window 2026. Liverpool didn’t lack ambition. They lacked balance.
Barcola may become a first-class Liverpool attacker. Jacquet may develop into a top defender. Other recruits may eventually justify their fees. Yet the immediate squad still contains an expensive surplus on the left side, fewer senior leaders at the back and no obvious specialist holding midfielder.
The club therefore spent around £250m without fully repairing the positions that became most vulnerable after the departures.
Liverpool fans don’t need every signing to succeed instantly. They need the recruitment strategy to make sense as a whole. Right now, the biggest purchases answer some questions while leaving the toughest ones sitting on Iraola’s desk.
That makes Barcola’s price, the three free exits and the missing number six the three most questionable decisions of the Liverpool summer transfer window 2026, because each one affects how the rest of the squad has to operate.
